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I. INTRODUCTION 
When pharmaceutical companies create a new drug, they can usually 
receive a patent, which allows them to operate with patent exclusivity for the 
life of the patent.1 This exclusive period allows drug companies to recoup 
their massive research and development expenses and eventually become 
profitable.2 Without some amount of patent exclusivity, it becomes 
economically irrational for a biotechnology company to invest the huge 
amounts of time and money required for the development of a drug.3 More 
recently, costs for pharmaceutical research and development have 
skyrocketed as traditional methods of small molecule drug development are 
starting to appear more “tapped out.”4 As a result, drug companies are 
forced to turn to more cutting-edge and expensive methods of 
development.5  
After a pharmaceutical company’s period of patent exclusivity elapses, 
generic companies can enter the market and offer essentially the same drug 
for a fraction of the price.6 Before obtaining the approval of the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), a generic company must certify that the 
branded drug: (1) has not been patented, (2) the applicable patents have 
expired, (3) the patents will expire on a given date and the generic will not 
be marketed before that date, or (4) the listed patents are not infringed or 
invalid.7  
Generic companies do not have the same up-front research costs that 
branded companies face. Additionally, since the introduction of the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (“Hatch-
Waxman Act”), generic drug companies may undergo a shortened FDA 
                                                           
*Taylor Stemler is 2L student at Mitchell Hamline School of Law with a background in 
biomedical engineering. He has tailored his legal education toward learning the patent system 
and hopes to use his engineering experience to specialize his practice in patent law with a 
focus on medical devices. Taylor would like to issue a special thanks to Chris Pinahs of 
Robins Kaplan, LLP, for his help and guidance on this article.   
1 Judge David M. Gersten, The Quest for Market Exclusivity in Biotechnology: Navigating 
the Patent Minefield, 2 NEURORX 572, 572 (2005). 
2 Id. at 573. 
3 Id. at 572. 
4 Id. at 573.  
5 Id. 
6 Exclusivity and Generic Drugs: What Does It Mean?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (FDA), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/111069/download [https://perma.cc/4Q3K-H4WR] (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2019).  
7 Himanshu Gupta, Suresh Kumar, Saroj Kumar Roy & R.S. Gaud, Patent Protection 
Strategies, 2 J. PHARM. BIOALLIED SCI. 2, 4 (2010) (noting certifications required for generic 
companies to obtain FDA approval under the Hatch-Waxman Act); see also 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(b)(2)(A) (2018). 
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approval process.8 Studies show that due to these limited upfront 
expenditures, generic drug companies may undercut the prices of branded 
drugs, thereby dropping the branded drug price as much as ninety percent 
within the first 2.5 years of generic entry.9 
To combat these extreme price drops, some branded pharmaceutical 
companies may choose to raise the price on branded drugs while they are 
still patented to get the greatest value from their patent protection period.10 
Others have developed strategies to achieve a greater period of patent 
exclusivity.11 These strategies effectively extend the patent protection for the 
products, which may minimize the damage from the drastic generic entry 
price drop or prevent generic entry to the market altogether.12 Tactics such 
as developing new formulations, creating new routes of administration, 
making changes to molecular structures, and finding new uses for products 
have all been used in some ways by branded pharmaceutical companies.13    
One new strategy that this article will examine in depth relates to 
patents on combination medicine and delivery device products.14 Frequently 
used combination products include pulmonary inhalers, injection systems, 
or infusion systems.15 This strategy presents a new set of challenges for 
lawmakers to navigate, since drug companies can attain patent protection on 
both the device and the underlying drug. After examining the ways in which 
this strategy is employed, this article will explore impacts of this strategy on 
patients and regulatory solutions that can mitigate its negative effects.16 
Lastly, one mitigation scheme will be identified as the best regulatory 
pathway for future legislation in the United States.17 
                                                           
8 Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement Patents, Drug Modifications, 
and the FDA, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1129, 1133 (2019); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2018); 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2018). 
9 IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, PRICE DECLINES AFTER BRANDED MEDICINES 
LOSE EXCLUSIVITY IN THE U.S. 2 (2016), https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/institute-
reports/price-declines-after-branded-medicines-lose-exclusivity-in-the-us.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EA7H-X56S]. 
10 Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price Be Evergreen, 5 J. L. BIOSCIENCE 590, 594 (2018). 
11 Id. at 596. 
12 Id. at 602.  
13 See Gupta et al., supra note 7, at 4–6. 
14 See infra Part IV. 
15 Richard Featherstone, Combination Products: Human Factors & Combination Products, 
15 DRUG DEV. & DELIVERY 22, 22 (2015), https://d2akihtr51eb46.cloudfront.net/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/MARCH-2015-WEB-FRIENDLY.pdf [https://perma.cc/TA7T-
JFKE]. 
16 See infra Sections IV.C–D. 
17 See infra Section IV.D. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Before exploring new patent extension strategies, it is helpful to 
provide an overview of the drug development process along with a 
discussion of pharmaceutical patenting and the Hatch-Waxman Act. An 
understanding of these concepts is useful when discussing how lawmakers 
have structured the regulatory pathway for new drugs in response to 
gamesmanship in the Hatch-Waxman and pharmaceutical patent system.   
A. New Drug Development and Approval Overview 
Developing and obtaining FDA approval for a new drug typically takes 
around twelve years and costs about $1.44 billion.18 The process begins 
when pharmaceutical companies supply grants to professors conducting 
basic research in universities to understand the mechanisms behind the 
diseases they hope to cure.19 After identifying some target mechanism for 
the potential treatment to attack, researchers employed by the 
pharmaceutical company will look into natural components from plants, 
animals, fungi, or other organisms to build a list of potential therapy 
candidates.20 This list may start with as many as 10,000 compounds, which 
are then narrowed down to around ten or twenty most likely to cure the 
disease.21 
Once the final list of candidates is created, the compounds will be 
tested to ensure that they are safe and effective. Before the compounds are 
used on humans, they may be tested using computer models, cells, and 
animals.22 This process will typically narrow down the list to between five 
and ten remaining compounds.23  
After this laboratory testing phase, the potential drugs are then moved 
into clinical trials.24 There are three main pre-approval phases of clinical 
trials.25 Phase one trials are typically small and aim to determine the 
                                                           
18 Ingrid Torjesen, Drug Development: The Journey of a Medicine from Lab to Shelf, 






22 Id.  
23 Id. 
24 Step 3: Clinical Research, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-
process/step-3-clinical-research [https://perma.cc/756E-ZLLX] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
25 Id.  
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tolerance, side effects, and coping effects of the drug.26 Phase two trials go 
on to determine how well the new treatment works, how to best manage the 
side effects, and the subtype of disease that the therapy works best on.27 
Lastly, phase three trials test a much larger group of patients and determine 
how the treatment affects one’s quality of life compared to alternative 
therapies.28  
After the successful completion of the clinical trials, which, in some 
circumstances, may be even more extensive than what is outlined above, the 
drug may be submitted for FDA approval.29 Submissions also require the 
completion of a New Drug Application (NDA).30 When submitting an 
NDA, the pharmaceutical company must list all of the patents relevant to its 
new drug for publication in the FDA’s Orange Book.31 Upon submission, 
the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) evaluates the 
drugs by weighing evidence from the clinical trials.32 This independent and 
unbiased review process is meant to determine whether the drug is safe and 
effective, whether the labeling and packaging are appropriate, and what 
manufacturing methods are appropriate for safe production.33  
B. Pharmaceutical Patenting 
Patents help advance innovation in the pharmaceutical industry by 
allowing inventors to recoup their costs and see a return on their research 
and development investment.34 Branded companies typically patent new 
compounds very early in the drug research process to protect their 
intellectual property from other drug developers.35 Since the FDA’s drug 
approval process can take an extremely long time, once a new drug finally 
                                                           
26 Id. 
27 Id.  
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 New Drug Application (NDA), FDA (June 10, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-
applications/new-drug-application-nda [https://perma.cc/3464-QLL7] [hereinafter New 
Drug Application].  
31 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2018) (“[A relevant patent is] any patent which claims the drug for 
which the applicant submitted the application or which claims a method of using such drug 
and with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a 
person not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”). 
32 How Drugs Are Developed and Approved, FDA (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs/how-drugs-are-developed-
and-approved [https://perma.cc/NK4F-Z2Z9]. 
33 New Drug Application, supra note 30.  
34 See ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 178 (2012). 
35 Feldman, supra note 10, at 598. 
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makes it to the market, often, a considerable amount of the life of the patent 
has elapsed. Patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office last for twenty years.36 However, estimates for the average life of 
patent protection remaining once a drug finally reaches the market show 
that the patent usually has only about twelve years left.37  
Pharmaceutical companies strive to extend the patent protection 
period of their products by covering them under multiple patents, which 
allows the companies to protect different aspects of an invention so that the 
product cannot be copied after the primary patent elapses.38 This practice 
may fall within what has been nicknamed “patent evergreening.” Patent 
evergreening is loosely defined as obtaining a secondary patent that extends 
a product’s exclusivity period without a proportionate benefit of any sort.39 
In the healthcare context, the definition of evergreening has been modified 
slightly to include secondary patents that extend a product’s exclusivity 
period without a proportionate therapeutic benefit.40 
Provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which will be discussed in 
greater detail in Section II.C., allow a patent holder to file for a patent-term 
extension.41 The length of the extension is based on the amount of time the 
drug spent in the clinical testing and regulatory review phases of the drug 
approval process.42 As long as the patent was issued prior to clinical testing, 
the patent term can be extended for one half of the clinical testing period, 
plus the full length of the regulatory review period.43 However, this extension 
may be reduced if the patent holder did not act reasonably diligently during 
clinical testing and regulatory review.44 The patent extension period may not 
exceed five years, and the total, extended patent life cannot exceed fourteen 
years upon approval.45 
                                                           
36 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018) (providing for twenty years of protection from the date of 
filing the patent application). 
37 Feldman, supra note 10, at 599. 
38 Id. 
39 Reed F. Beall, Jason W. Nickerson, Warren A. Kaplan & Amir Attaran, Is Patent 
“Evergreening” Restricting Access to Medicine/Device Combination Products?, 11 PLOS 
ONE 1, 8 (2016). 
40 Id. 
41 See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2018).  
42 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.775–1.779 (2019).  
43 Id. The calculation of the length of the extension period varies depending on the type of 
product for which an extension is sought. Id. 
44 John Murray & Heidi Dare, Patent Term Extension Under 35 U.S.C. § 156, BRINKS 
GILSON & LIONE 1 (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.brinksgilson.com/files/
biopharma_article_3.3.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3PM-9PKZ]. 
45 Id.  
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C. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
To understand the methods and effects of pharmaceutical 
evergreening, it is important to be familiar with the provisions of the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984—the Hatch-
Waxman Act.46 This act was intended to provide an accelerated path for 
generic entry while maintaining patent protection for branded 
pharmaceutical companies.47 Rather than requiring generic drug companies 
to go through the entire new-drug approval process, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
permits them to file an abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) and 
establish bioequivalence with the approved branded drug.48 This 
abbreviated process was meant to make more low-cost generic drugs 
available to the public.49  
After the branded drug manufacturer receives approval of their NDA 
by the FDA, the new drug is added to the FDA’s Orange Book.50 When a 
generic drug company seeks FDA approval of its product, it must show not 
only bioequivalence but also that:  
(1) the active ingredient of the generic drug is the same as that of 
the pioneer drug; (2) the generic drug has the same route of 
administration, dosage form and strength as the pioneer drug; 
and (3) the generic drug’s labeling must be same as the labeling 
of the pioneer drug.51 
Additionally, a generic drug company must certify that the patents 
listed in the Orange Book by the named brand: (i) have not been filed, (ii) 
are expired, (iii) will expire by a given date, or (iv) are invalid or will not be 
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new generic drug.52 If the 
generic drug applicant wishes to proceed under paragraph IV, it must 
                                                           
46 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 301, 355, 360 (2018)).   
47 Martha M. Rumore, The Hatch-Waxman Act—25 Years Later: Keeping the 




49 H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984) (additionally stating that “[t]he availability of 
generic versions of pioneer drugs approved after 1962 would save American consumers $920 
million over the next 12 years”). 
50 Orange Book Preface, FDA (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-
approval-process-drugs/orange-book-preface [https://perma.cc/GCS7-RHB9]. 
51 Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch-Waxman 
Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 423 (2011) (citing 21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) (2018)). 
52 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2018). 
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provide notice to the patent holder and the NDA applicant with a detailed 
explanation of why the patent is not infringed or should be declared 
invalid.53 If the NDA holder then brings a patent infringement lawsuit within 
forty-five days of this notice, the FDA is barred from granting approval to 
the ANDA holder for thirty months.54 Otherwise, if no lawsuit is filed within 
the forty-five-day period, or if the ANDA declares only Paragraph I or II 
certifications, the FDA must approve the ANDA, provided that all other 
approval requirements are satisfied.55  
As an incentive for generic companies to enter the market, the Hatch-
Waxman Act allows the first generic ANDA applicant to enter the market 
with a 180-day exclusivity period, during which no other generic companies 
may be granted FDA approval.56 This effectively allows the generic and 
branded companies to share FDA exclusivity for a period of time.57 The 
idea behind this is to “encourage generic companies to challenge 
questionably weak or invalid patents.”58 
Although the Hatch-Waxman Act seems to give generic manufacturers 
many advantages throughout the path to market approval, there are 
provisions within it that serve branded NDA holders as well. An NDA 
holder may list additional patents in the Orange Book after an ANDA is 
submitted, and if they do so, “the ANDA applicant must make additional 
certifications within 30 days of the listing of the new patent.”59 Further, 
Hatch-Waxman creates additional FDA exclusivity periods for NDA 
holders that prohibit generic manufacturers from submitting an ANDA for 
three to five years after approval of the NDA.60 NDA holders are entitled to 
this exclusivity period regardless of whether the underlying patents on the 
                                                           
53 Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II). 
54 See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
55 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i), 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
56 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I). 
57 Id.  
58 Kelly, supra note 51, at 431 (citing Mary W. Bourke & M. Edward Danberg, Current 
Trends in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation: A System Still in Flux, 878 PRACT. L. INST., 
939, 960 (2006); Legislative and Regulatory Responses to the FTC Study on Barriers to Entry 
in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th 
Cong. 8, 14 (2003) (statement of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, FTC) (“[The 180-day 
exclusivity] provision provides an incentive for companies to challenge patent validity and to 
design around patents.”)). 
59 Kelly, supra note 51, at 420 (citing Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of 
the Hatch-Waxman Scheme on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, 45 IDEA J.L. & TECH. 164, 174 (2004)). 
60 Id. 
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drug are expired.61 Problems arising from these statutory provisions are 
explained in the following section. 
D. Evergreening Using the Hatch-Waxman Act 
Although specific evergreening strategies will be discussed in more 
detail in Parts III–IV below, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a general 
framework that drug companies can leverage to extend the length of their 
patent and FDA exclusivity periods and block generic competitors.62 For 
example, branded manufacturer, Marion Merrell Dow, took advantage of 
the thirty-month stay provision for a secondary patent on their Seldane 
product. After Baker Norton filed an ANDA claiming paragraph IV non-
infringement, Marion sued for infringement even though, “[s]imply stated, 
Baker Norton’s proposed activity [was] outside the scope of the . . . patent.”63 
However, in this case, the FDA still initiated the thirty-month stay.64 Thus, 
although Baker Norton was granted summary judgment on the infringement 
issue, Marrion was able to take advantage of the entire thirty-month stay 
period of exclusivity.65   
The FDA requires only patents related to drug substance, drug 
formulation, and method of use to be submitted to the Orange Book.66 This 
rule also explicitly prohibits patents related to the “packaging, metabolites, 
or intermediates” from being included with the NDA.67 Interestingly, 
however, the FDA does not have any “regulatory mechanisms for reviewing 
patent listings” made by NDA holders.68 In fact, the FDA has expressed that 
it does not even conduct a “review of submitted patent information to 
determine, at least on a very general basis, applicability to the particular 
NDA in question.”69 Accordingly, in the interest of preventing competitors 
                                                           
61 Id. 
62 See infra Parts III–IV. 
63 Marion Merrell Dow Inc. v. Baker Norton Pharm., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1050, 1057 (S.D. 
Fla. 1996). 
64 Id. at 1051 n.3. 
65 Id. at 1057.  
66 FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 5 (2002), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-
expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B9M-QNGV]. 
67 Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676, 36,678 (June 
18, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).  
68 See id. at 36,683. 
69 Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent and Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 50,338, 50,343 (Oct. 3, 1994) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314). 
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from entering the market, NDA holders often take wide latitudes when 
determining the types of patents to list in the Orange Book.70 
NDA holders may also “late-list” patents that were not included in the 
original NDA.71 If an NDA holder lists a patent in the Orange Book after a 
generic company files an ANDA, the ANDA applicant must still make a 
certification regarding the newly listed patent.72 Although the 2003 
amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act do not allow for the NDA holder 
to obtain a second thirty-month stay against an ANDA applicant, a 
Paragraph IV certification may result in patent infringement litigation 
between the NDA holder and the ANDA applicant, the costs of which may 
ultimately deter an ANDA applicant from entering the market.73 
III. HISTORICAL PHARMACEUTICAL EVERGREENING STRATEGIES AND 
RESPONSES 
Pharmaceutical evergreening often involves obtaining secondary 
patents on features of a drug other than the main active ingredient. 
Secondary patents may cover aspects of the product, such as a tablet’s 
coating, alternate crystalline structures of the drug, or methods of use.74 
These secondary patents are often weaker than the original patent on the 
drug itself; however, they may still be used to either delay a generic drug’s 
market approval or make market entry prohibitively expensive.75 
A. New Uses 
1. Overview and Examples 
New uses for a drug currently on the market will sometimes allow a 
drug developer to obtain new method-of-use patents.76 Thus, developing 
                                                           
70 Kelly, supra note 51, at 438 (citing Terry G. Mahn, Patenting Drug Products: Anticipating 
Hatch-Waxman Issues During the Claims Drafting Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 250 
(1999)). 
71 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(d)(3) (2019).  
72 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(i)(4) & (6), 314.94(a)(12)(vi) & (viii) (2019). 
73 Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36676. 
74 Tahir Amin & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Secondary Patenting of Branded Pharmaceuticals: A 
Case Study of How Patents on Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended for Decades, 31 
HEALTH AFF. 2286 (2012).  
75 Id. at 2286–87.   
76 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 
717, 720 (2005).  
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new uses for a patented drug may help the patent holder maximize research 
dollars and prolong the commercial life of the drug.77  
Several pharmaceutical companies have successfully deployed this new 
method-of-use patenting strategy.78 One example of this is Merck’s patents 
for its branded versions of the drug Finasteride.79 Finasteride is the active 
ingredient in Proscar, a drug first patented by Merck in 1992 for treating 
enlarged prostates with a five-milligram tablet.80 When Proscar came off 
patent in 2006, the FDA approved Merck’s competitors to begin 
manufacturing and selling generic versions of Proscar.81  
However, in 1997, Merck received a second patent on Finasteride 
when it proved that a lower one-milligram dose of the drug could help treat 
male pattern baldness.82 Using the protection from this patent, Merck 
continued marketing Finasteride as a one-milligram pill under the brand 
name Propecia for treating baldness at a price twenty-six times greater than 
it could have with Proscar.83  
Some criticize “use patents” that pharmaceutical companies obtain and 
attempt to deploy as unfair evergreening.84 Supporting this viewpoint is the 
fact that method-of-use patents have allowed branded competition to extend 
their patent exclusivity in the United States for an average of 7.4 years.85 
However, as traditional methods for discovering new drugs become less 
successful and more expensive, the idea of discovering new uses for old 
drugs is gaining in popularity.86  
One example illustrates just how important use patents can be to 
society. Although originally created and marketed as a potential treatment 
for cancer, azidothymidine was later found to be an effective treatment for 
                                                           
77 Gupta et al., supra note 7, at 6. 
78 Id. at 6.  
79 Id. 
80 Marc Joffe, The Strange and Very Expensive World of Prescription Drugs, MERCATUS 
CTR. (Nov. 1, 2010), https://www.mercatus.org/expert_commentary/strange-and-very-
expensive-world-prescription-drugs [https://perma.cc/Z8EP-YS7R]. 
81 Id.  
82 Id. 
83 Gupta et al., supra note 7, at 6; see also Jonathan J. Darrow, The High Cost of Health Care: 
Why Some Pay $240 for a $9 Bottle of Pills, HARV. L.: PETRIE-FLOM CTR. (Feb. 15, 2003), 
http://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/15/the-high-cost-of-health-care-why-some-
pay-240-for-a-9-bottle-of-pills [https://perma.cc/W8KJ-7PJ8]; Joffe, supra note 80. 
84 Arti K. Rai & Grant Rice, Use Patents Can Be Useful: The Case of Rescued Drugs, 6 SCI. 
TRANSLATIONAL MED. 248, 248 (2014).   
85 Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park, & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh 
My!): An Empirical Analysis of “Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 5 
(2012).  
86 Rai & Rice, supra note 84.  
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helping patients with HIV.87 It is unlikely that, without the patent incentive 
for this new use of the drug, azidothymidine would have been worth the 
additional research and development investment to find new uses and gain 
new approvals.88  
2. Skinny Labeling 
More recently, patents on new uses have become less valuable due to 
the FDA now allowing generic drugs to engage in a practice known as 
“skinny labeling.”89 As stated before, generic companies are allowed to 
manufacture and sell an off-patent drug for an off-patent use once their 
ANDA is approved by the FDA.90 When marketing the generic version of 
the drug, the ANDA applicant may only list the off-patent uses on the drug’s 
label.91 However, if the branded company receives a patent and FDA 
approval for a new use of the drug, physicians may still prescribe the generic 
skinny-labeled version for this patented new use.92 Thus, a branded drug 
company can invest heavily in clinical trials and regulatory submissions to 
have an alternative use approved, only to be immediately undercut by 
physicians prescribing skinny-labeled generic drugs in place of the branded 
drug marketed and labeled for that use.93  
The Federal Circuit has validated this practice by holding that mere 
knowledge by a generic company that its product is being used to infringe 
patent rights is insufficient to show induced infringement.94 Rather, the 
Federal Circuit requires the generic company to have actually marketed the 
product for the infringing use.95 Thus, by merely selling the drugs that 
physicians prescribe for a patented use, generic manufacturers do not 
infringe the branded drug patents.  
                                                           
87 Adam Houldsworth, Pressure Piles on US Pharma and Biotech IP Owners, IAM (Jan. 31, 
2019), https://www.iam-media.com/law-policy/why-evergreening-not-dirty-word 
[https://perma.cc/7A5G-ESZQ].  
88 Id.  
89 Rai & Rice, supra note 84.  
90 See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text (discussing the off-patent use of Proscar). 
91 Rai & Rice, supra note 84.  
92 Id.  
93 Id. 
94 Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
95 Id. at 1365.  
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3. Branded Response to Skinny Labeling 
a. Use Codes 
To prevent generic skinny labeling, brand-name companies have also 
submitted overly broad use code claims to the FDA Orange Book to 
artificially increase the scope of their patented uses, thereby limiting the 
ability of generic companies to identify and list an unprotected use on their 
labels.96 This practice can be effective because, as mentioned before, the 
FDA plays a very limited role in screening out overly broad Orange Book 
submissions.97  
However, in Caraco, the United States Supreme Court determined 
that overly broad use codes submitted to the FDA’s Orange Book could be 
challenged by generic companies.98 In Caraco, Novo Nordisk’s only 
unexpired patent covered a fairly narrow use—treating non-insulin-
dependent diabetes through a combination of its drug, repaglinide, and 
another drug, metformin.99 In contrast, the Orange Book use code that was 
claimed by Novo Nordisk attempted to cover every method of “improving 
glycemic control in adults with type 2 diabetes.”100 This much broader claim 
effectively prevented generic companies from skinny labeling the drug and 
marketing it for any use.101 In its opinion, the Court held that the 2003 
amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act allowed generic companies to file 
a counterclaim to correct an overly broad use code listed in the Orange 
Book.102 Absent the ability to do so, a generic drug company would be 
unable to market its product for any non-infringing uses.103 
The Caraco decision seems to follow both the statutory language and 
legislative intent behind the 2003 Hatch-Waxman amendments.104 The 
practices employed by Novo Nordisk had been thoroughly documented by 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and served as an impetus for the new 
legislation.105 However, as noted in Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, the 
                                                           
96 Gregory J. Glover, ANDA Section VIII Label Carve-Outs Explained, PHARM. L. GROUP 
(Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.pharmalawgrp.com/blog/1/anda-section-viii-label-carve-outs-
explained/ [https://perma.cc/P49Q-82SN]. 
97 Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,683. 
98 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 425–26 (2012). 
99 Id. at 409. 
100 Id. at 410.  
101 Arti K. Rai, Use Patents, Carve-Outs, and Incentives—A New Battle in the Drug-Patent 
Wars, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 491, 492 (2012).  
102 Caraco, 566 U.S. at 426.  
103 Id. 
104 Rai, supra note 101. 
105 Id.; see also FTC, supra note 66, at 1.  
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2003 amendments are suboptimal for generic companies.106 To correct an 
overly broad use-listing in the Orange Book, a generic company must first 
provoke the branded company into suing it for patent infringement by filing 
a paragraph IV invalidity or noninfringement certification.107  
Justice Sotomayor noted two potential problems with this requirement. 
First, it undoubtedly requires the generic company to incur significant 
expenses in litigation and further delays generic entry.108 Second, the statute 
is silent on what would happen if the branded company did not launch a 
lawsuit against the generic paragraph IV applicant.109 The FDA might still 
approve the ANDA.110 If, however, the generic company was approved, the 
generic company would be forced into marketing the product with a label 
identical to the branded manufacturer’s.111 In this case, the generic company 
would likely then be liable to the branded company for induced 
infringement of the underlying patent.112 Either way, the generic company is 
placed in a tough position.  
b. Rescue Drugs 
In certain situations, good faith patenting on legitimate secondary uses 
may still allow branded drug companies to prevent themselves from being 
immediately undercut by physicians prescribing skinny-labeled generic 
drugs. These situations involve drugs that went through the clinical trial 
stage, were determined to be safe for use in humans, but were ultimately 
abandoned due to lack of efficacy.113 Often, these abandoned drugs are old, 
and the original patent on their chemical composition expired.  
Rediscovering, repurposing, and patenting these drugs for a different 
use than that originally intended can help deliver new therapies to patients 
while still allowing drug companies to see a return on their investments. 
These “rescue drug” method-of-use patents allow companies to maintain 
patent protection just as they would with a composition-of-matter patent.114 
Because there is no FDA approved, off-patent use for the rescue drugs, 
there is no way for generic companies to skinny label around the branded 
                                                           
106 Caraco, 566 U.S. at 426 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
107 Id.  
108 Id. 
109 Id.  
110 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)) (“[W]ithout prejudice to infringement claims the 
patent owner might assert when the ANDA applicant produces or markets the generic 
drug.”). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 428. 
113 Rai & Rice, supra note 84. 
114 Id.  
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drugs.115 Without this type of patent protection, there would be no financial 
incentive for a company to investigate or work to approve new uses for 
already developed drugs.116 Therefore, patients would stand to lose out on 
many therapies that could otherwise be available.117  
One of the more famous examples of utilizing a method-of-use patent 
for an initially failed drug is the erectile dysfunction (ED) drug, Viagra.118 
Although Viagra was ineffective and abandoned for treating hypertension, it 
was found to be useful for treating ED.119 After obtaining a method-of-use 
patent in 1994, the patent was successfully upheld and asserted in an 
infringement action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia.120 
B. New Formulations 
1. Overview and Examples 
A pharmaceutical company may also choose to patent a new 
formulation of a drug to extend its patented life. Often, these new 
formulations may involve new strengths and dosage forms of the previous 
product.121 These new formulations may be protected by additional patents 
and may receive a three-year period of exclusivity for “new clinical 
investigation” under the Hatch-Waxman Act.122 Studies have shown that the 
practice of introducing new pharmaceutical formulations may be so 
prevalent that about half of the new small-molecule drugs approved in 2002 
have introduced new formulation products, usually within five years of 
launching the original product.123  
In one illustrative example, a new formulation allowed the branded 
manufacturer to maintain several additional years of patent protection after 
                                                           
115 Id.  
116 Id.   
117 Id. 
118 Savvas Kerdemelidis, Deadly Gaps in the Patent System: An Analysis of Current 
and Alternative Mechanisms for Incentivising Development of Medical Therapies 88 (2014) 
(unpublished Master of Laws thesis, University of Canterbury) (on file with University of 
Canterbury libraries).  
119 Id.  
120 See Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 2d 409 (E.D. Va. 2011). 
121 Reed F. Beall et al., New Drug Formulations and Their Respective Generic Entry Dates, 
25 J. MANAGED CARE & SPECIALTY PHARMACY 218, 218 (2019). 
122 Renu Lal, Patents and Exclusivity, FDA/CDER SBIA CHRONICLES 2 (May 19, 2015), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/smallbusinessassistance
/ucm447307.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BJJ-XXZP]. 
123 Beall et al., supra note 121, at 219.  
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generic companies entered the market.124  Otsuka developed an aripiprazole 
that is used to treat mental conditions such as schizophrenia, bipolar mania, 
and major depressive disorder.125 After generic companies entered the 
market and began competing with Otsuka with the original tablet form of 
the medication, Otsuka developed an injectable, extended-release 
formulation of the product that allowed them to maintain a monopoly over 
the extended-release form.126 The injectable formulation had some benefits, 
such as less frequent administration, which was likely to benefit certain 
patients in need.127 This new formulation is an example of a pharmaceutical 
innovation for which patients were willing to pay a premium price.  
At its core, new formulations of drugs certainly do have some positive 
effects. New formulations are typically introduced shortly after approval of 
the original product.128 If a drug company wants to extend the length of its 
patent protection with new formulations, it may be more inclined to wait 
until its original patents are about to expire before obtaining additional 
patents on new formulations. The fact that this is generally not the case 
indicates that, rather than solely trying to extend the life of their patent 
protection, some drug companies are attempting to provide greater choices 
to patients who are unable to use the original formulation of the product.129 
This practice further suggests that at least some manufacturers are merely 
being diligent by continuously improving their products and striving to add 
value for a larger patient base.130  
Additionally, since the scope of these secondary patents is narrower, 
they achieve the dual purpose of creating an incentive to research new 
therapeutic benefits of a product without blocking access to the drug itself.131 
The new formulation patents do not extend the term of the original patent 
on the chemical compound.132 Accordingly, after the original composition 
                                                           
124 Id. at 222. 
125 John P. Cunha, Aripiprazole, RXLIST (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.rxlist.com/consumer_
aripiprazole_abilify/drugs-condition.htm [https://perma.cc/JDE5-RT8J].  
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Beall et al., supra note 121, at 222. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Christopher M. Holman, Timo Minssen & Eric M. Solovy, Patentability Standards for 
Follow-On Pharmaceutical Innovation, 37 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 131, 132 (2018) (citing 
Eric M. Solovy and Pavan S. Krishnamurthy, TRIPS Agreement Flexibilities and Their 
Limitations: A Response to the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel Report on Access 
to Medicines, 50 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 69, 106 (2017)). 
132 Id. at 137 (citing Solovy & Krishnamurthy, supra note 131) (“Granting patents on 
improvements to prior formulations of a product encourages pharmaceutical companies to 
innovate, creating new products with improved safety and/or effectiveness over existing 
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of the matter patent expires, there is no patent-based restriction on the 
generic companies entering the market and competing with branded 
products.133  
Some say that unless this secondary patent covers a valuable new 
advancement that consumers are willing to pay for, it will essentially be 
worthless and not have any impact on the market for the original drug.134 In 
theory, this is because consumers, who see the much more expensive 
patented drug, will be able to determine that the value of the patented 
advancement is not proportional to the increased cost. In that case, the 
consumer will instead opt for the cheaper generic version of the original off-
patent product.135 Indeed, a leading patent expert, Judge Giles Rich of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, has expressed, “A monopoly 
on something nobody wants is pretty much . . . a nullity. That is one of the 
beauties of the patent system. The reward is measured automatically by the 
popularity of the contribution.”136  
Unfortunately, however, the pharmaceutical industry does not always 
work so neatly. The pharmaceutical market requires the doctor to select the 
drug for the patient.137 Because the doctor does not bear the cost of the 
prescription, often they will not even know or consider the price of the drug, 
and patients have minimal say in selecting a cheaper alternative.138 In this 
way, the pharmaceutical market does not function like a free market 
economy, and, as a result, Judge Rich’s theory breaks down.139 Certain 
tactics, such as the product hop, show how these unique aspects of the 
pharmaceutical industry permit gamesmanship of the patent system and the 
Hatch-Waxman Act by pharmaceutical companies.  
2. The Product Hop 
One strategy that patent holders often employ is the product hop. 
Although product hopping can be used with other secondary patenting 
methods, it is useful to include in this section on new formulations because 
the most popular examples of product hopping have featured patents on 
                                                           
pharmaceutical products, but without removing older and less expensive variants from the 
market.”). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 137–38. 
135 Id. at 138. 
136 Id. at 138 (quoting Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 
402 (1960)). 
137 New York v. Actavis PLC (Namenda), 787 F.3d 638, 645–46 (2d Cir. 2015). 
138 Id.  
139 Id.; see also Rich, supra note 136. 
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new formulations.140 As illustrated in the following cases, product hopping 
involves using provisions within the Hatch-Waxman Act, patent laws, and 
drug substitution laws to block generic competition and ensure that patients 
continue to purchase monopolized products. The tactic has been combated 
with mixed success using antitrust laws.141 
C. New York v. Actavis PLC (Namenda) 
Actavis developed a patented drug called Namenda IR for treating 
Alzheimer’s patients.142 However, as the Namenda IR patents were set to 
expire in 2015, generic companies began preparing to rush into the market 
with low-cost alternatives.143 Shortly before the IR patent’s expiration, 
Actavis went on to announce a newly patented, extended-release 
formulation, Namenda XR, which would not come off patent until 2029.144 
The XR formulation only required drug administration once per day, rather 
than the twice-a-day IR formulation.145 To transfer patients to its newly 
patent-protected product, Actavis began promoting the XR formulation to 
doctors, pharmacists, and caregivers while temporarily lowering the price of 
the XR below that of the IR version.146 Months before the release of generic 
Namenda IR, Actavis announced that they would discontinue selling 
Namenda IR.147 Since the branded IR formulation was no longer on the 
market, drug substitution laws did not allow prescriptions to be substituted 
for the generic formulation.148  
In response to Actavis’s actions, the State of New York filed a 
complaint seeking to block Actavis’s product hop, alleging that Actavis was 
                                                           
140 See Namenda, 787 F.3d at 645–46 (involving a product hop to a new extended release 
formulation of the drug); see also Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co. 
(Doryx), 838 F.3d 421, 429 (3d Cir. 2016) (involving product hops to various new tablet 
formulations). 
141 See Namenda, 787 F.3d at 655–58 (holding that introducing a new patented formulation 
while simultaneously pulling the soon-to-be off-patent formulation from the market violated 
provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act); Doryx, 838 F.3d at 438–39 (finding that 
defendants actions were not anticompetitive because plaintiff was advantaged by its 180-day 
exclusivity period and other substitute drug options remained available for consumers). 
142 Karshtedt, supra note 8, at 1168.  
143 Namenda, 787 F.3d at 645–46.  
144 Id. at 647. 
145 Memantine Hydrochloride—Drug Summary, PRESCRIBERS’ DIGITAL REFERENCE, 
https://www.pdr.net/drug-summary/Namenda-XR-memantine-hydrochloride-
2438#targetText=CrCl%205%20to%2029%20mL,(XR)%20form%20is%20recommended 
[https://perma.cc/EK2J-4PES] (last visited Mar. 27, 2020). 
146 Namenda, 787 F.3d at 648. 
147 Id.  
148 Id.  
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violating provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act.149 To show that Actavis 
was violating the law, New York had to prove “(1) that the defendant ha[d] 
engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to 
monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly 
power.”150 
The Second Circuit found that by introducing the new XR formulation 
while simultaneously withdrawing the IR formulation, patients were forced 
into switching prescriptions, which impeded generic competition and 
amounted to anticompetitive conduct under the Sherman Antitrust Act.151 
In reaching this conclusion, the court examined both the consumer 
coercion effects and the likely impediment to competition.152 Lastly, a 
“dangerous probability” of monopoly power was present because of the 
unique characteristics of the Alzheimer’s pharmaceutical market and the 
way the product-hopping scheme could circumvent drug substitution laws.153  
D. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Public Co. (Doryx) 
To receive approval of an ANDA, a generic company must first show 
that its product is bioequivalent and therapeutically equivalent to the 
branded product.154 If the generic company both proves measures of 
equivalence and earns an AB rating, state laws permit pharmacists to 
substitute the generic for the branded prescription. To achieve an AB rating 
for drug tablets,155 most state laws require generic companies to demonstrate 
that their tablets are identical in size and scoring to the branded drug.156 
Doryx, an off-patent doxycycline hyclate capsule used for treating acne, 
was approved by the FDA in 1985.157 After facing unsuccessful sales on the 
capsule product, Mayne, the drug manufacturer, and Warner, the 
                                                           
149 Id. at 649; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2018). 
150 Namenda, 787 F.3d at 651 (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 
456 (1993)).  
151 Id. at 654. 
152 Id. at 654–58. 
153 Id. at 655. 
154 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2018). 
155 Generally, multisource drug products with identical active ingredients, strength, dosage 
forms, and routes of administration are coded as AB if the data demonstrate bioequivalence. 
Orange Book Preface, FDA, supra note 50 (citation omitted). AB-rated drugs are drugs that 
meet the necessary bioequivalence standards established by the Food and Drug 
Administration. What is an AB-Rated Drug (Non-AB-Rated Drug), TAKERX, 
www.takerx.com/abrated.html [https://perma.cc/XBY9-4C37] (last visited Mar. 27, 2020).  
156  Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Co. (Doryx), 838 F.3d 421, 428 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
157 Id. at 429. 
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distributor (collectively “Mayne”), decided to develop a new extended-
release tablet formulation of the drug.158 After receiving FDA approval for 
the tablet, Mayne stopped selling the capsule formulation.159  
Later, Mayne proceeded to implement a sequence of changes to the 
capsule size and scoring, each of which would require generic 
manufacturers to file a new ANDA and await regulatory approval before 
returning to market and benefiting from drug substitution laws.160 To 
compete with Mayne, Mylan developed each iteration and obtained ANDA 
approval for each of the four changes before subsequently being shut out of 
the market when Mayne pulled its previous designs from the shelves.161  
Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that Mayne indeed 
changed its tablets primarily to delay generic market entry, the court found 
that the conduct did not create a dangerous possibility of monopoly 
power.162 To reach this conclusion, the court noted that the relevant market 
should include more than just Doryx and, accordingly, examined all oral 
tetracyclines used to treat acne.163 When viewed from this broader 
perspective, Mayne held only eighteen percent of the market.164 
Consequently, the court held that Mayne’s conduct did not rise to the level 
prohibited by the Sherman Antitrust Act.165 
E. Reconciling Namenda and Doryx 
 In both Namenda and Doryx, courts found that discontinuing a 
product on its own does not amount to exclusionary conduct.166 Under an 
antitrust analysis, courts must find some additional coercive conduct by the 
branded company that forces consumers to purchase their products.167 This 
question can be especially complicated and nuanced for judges and juries 
who are unfamiliar with the complexities of the pharmaceutical industry to 
make an informed decision.168 It involves a combination of analyzing 
complicated antitrust law, patent law, the Hatch-Waxman Act, and state 
                                                           
158 Id.  
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 430. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id.  
164 Id. at 436. 
165 Id. at 439. 
166 Id. at 430. 
167 Id. at 440–41.  
168 Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 169 (2016).  
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drug substitution laws.169 Accordingly, the antitrust analysis is especially 
prone to deliver inconsistent and ill-informed results. Indeed, courts have 
acknowledged that they are ill-equipped to handle these types of decisions.170   
F. Chiral Switches  
1. Chirality Explained 
Two-thirds of the drugs currently on the market contain chiral 
molecules.171 Simply put, a chiral molecule lacks symmetry within its 
molecular structure.172 As a result, chiral molecules have counterparts called 
enantiomers that are mirror images of the chiral molecules.173 A mix of two 
different enantiomers is known as a racemic mixture.174  
The body typically interacts with different enantiomers in different 
ways.175 Usually, one enantiomer—the eutomer—will have more desired 
bioactive effects, while the other enantiomer—the distomer—is biologically 
inactive or even toxic to humans.176 Originally, drugs were primarily racemic 
mixtures.177 However, in the 1980s, scientists began purifying these mixtures 
into just their therapeutically beneficial enantiomers.178 In some cases, when 
purified, the drugs may be taken in smaller doses or have fewer associated 
side effects.179 
                                                           
169 Id.  
170 See, e.g., Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 
1000 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To weigh the benefits of an improved product design against the 
resulting injuries to competitors is not just unwise, it is unadministrable. There are no criteria 
that courts can use to calculate the ‘right’ amount of innovation, which would maximize social 
gains and minimize competitive injury.”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 
948 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Antitrust scholars have long recognized the undesirability of having 
courts oversee product design, and any dampening of technological innovation would be at 
crosspurposes with antitrust law.”). 
171 Lien Ai Nguyen, Hua He & Chuong Pham-Huy, Chiral Drugs: An Overview, 2 INT. J. 
BIOMEDICAL SCI. 85, 85 (2006). 
172 Id. at 89.  
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 86. 
175 Id. at 94. 
176 Id. 
177 Israel Agranat, Hava Caner & John Caldwell, Putting Chirality to Work: The Strategy of 
Chiral Switches, 1 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 753, 753 (2002).   
178 Id. at 753–754. 
179 Id. at 754. 
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2. Overview and Examples 
When developing a new drug, the FDA gives developers some leeway 
to choose their own stereochemistry as long as they demonstrate an 
understanding of the effects of the different enantiomers.180 As a result, 
strategic thinking about patent protection for the new drug may play a role 
in decisions regarding the stereochemistry of the drug. In particular, 
companies may first opt to patent a slightly less effective racemic mixture 
and later obtain a patent on the eutomer once the patent term is close to 
expiration.181 This chiral switch has been estimated to extend the patent life 
for an additional five years.182 Interestingly, at least one study has found that 
many blockbuster single enantiomer drugs show no evidence of superiority 
to their older racemic mixture counterparts.183 
An example of the chiral-switch patent extension method can be seen 
with Nexium, developed by AstraZeneca. AstraZeneca originally obtained 
a patent and FDA approval for the racemic Prilosec to treat acid reflux.184 
By 2000, Prilosec was the best-selling medicine in the world and was earning 
$5 billion a year in the United States alone.185 By 2003, when the Prilosec 
patent expired, the company was already actively advertising a newly 
patented enantiomer version of Nexium.186 Because Prilosec had no major 
side effects, switching from the racemic mixture to the enantiomer provided 
no significant clinical benefits to patients.187 AstraZeneca also was successful 
in switching Prilosec and its generic counterparts onto the over-the-counter 
market while maintaining a prescription status for Nexium. By doing this, 
the company was able to further thwart generic competition by creating the 
illusion that the new prescription Nexium was the stronger product.188  
                                                           
180 Id. at 755. 
181 Id.  
182 W.H. Brooks, W.C. Guida & K.G. Kaniel, The Significance of Chirality in Drug Design 
and Development, 11 CURRENT TOPICS IN MED. CHEMISTRY 760, 763 (2011) (specifically § 
2.2.1). 
183 See Walid F. Gellad, Phillip Choi, Margaret Mizah, Chester B. Good & Aaron S. 
Kesselheim, Assessing the Chiral Switch: Approval and Use of Single-Enantiomer Drugs, 20 
AM. J. MANAGED CARE e90, e90 (2014).  
184 Id. 
185 Merrill Goozner, From The $800 Million Pill—Me Too!, 6 MEDSCAPE GEN. MED. 57, 67 
(2004). 
186 Joffe, supra note 80. 
187 Goozner, supra note 185, at 83. 
188 Id. at 84.  
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IV. DRUG-DEVICE COMBINATION AS A PATENT EXTENSION STRATEGY 
A. Drug-Device Combination Products Explained 
According to the Code of Federal Regulations, a combination product 
is “[a] product comprised of two or more regulated components, i.e., 
drug/device, biologic/device, drug/biologic, or drug/device/biologic, that are 
physically, chemically, or otherwise combined or mixed and produced as a 
single entity.”189 As technological advances continue to blur the lines between 
product types, the FDA expects to receive more and more combination 
products for review.190 Currently, the most common types of drug-device 
combination products include pulmonary inhalers, injection systems, and 
infusion systems.191 Other frequently seen combination products include 
nasal sprays, creams, eye drops, ear drops, drug-eluting stents, and 
transdermal patches.192 Many conditions, such as asthma, diabetes, and 
allergic reactions, are often treated using a medicine paired with a specific 
device.193  
B. Overview and Examples 
Medicines and devices that are used together are typically patentable 
separately from one another.194 By patenting the medicine and the device, 
companies can prolong their patent exclusivity since the various device 
patents can typically outlast those for the medicine itself.195  
Additionally, section 3038 of the 21st Century Cures Act of 2016 
creates an expedited regulatory pathway for patenting combination products 
with an already approved constituent part and allows drug-device 
combination patents, also referred to as tertiary patents, to be listed in the 
Orange Book.196 By listing these patents in the Orange Book, drug-device 
                                                           
189 21 C.F.R. § 3.2 (2019). 
190 About Combination Products, FDA (June 18, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/combination-
products/about-combination-products [https://perma.cc/3DQN-FRQR]. 
191 Featherstone, supra note 15, at 22. 
192 Id.  
193 Beall et al., supra note 39, at 2. 
194 Id.  
195 Reed F. Beall & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Tertiary Patenting on Drug-Device Combination 
Products in the United States, 36 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY, 142, 142 (2018) (explaining 
that device patents typically outlast the patents on the drug itself because device patents can 
be updated and patented incrementally). 
196 Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3038, 130 Stat. 1033, 1105–10 (2016) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. §§ 353(g), 360(j)(h)(4) (2018)); Sydney R. Kestle, Paula E. Miller & David K. Mroz, 
Should Drug-Delivery Device Patents Be Listed in the Orange Book?, AM. PHARM. REV. 
(Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.americanpharmaceuticalreview.com/Featured-Articles/341252-
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combination product manufacturers are better able to prevent generic entry 
by requiring generics to either await the expiration of the patents or make a 
paragraph IV certification and risk being sued for infringement.197 While the 
FDA explicitly prohibits listing patents related to the packaging of drugs, 
interestingly, the agency is silent on whether drug delivery patents that do 
not claim the drug itself should be placed in the Orange Book.198 However, 
by not rejecting listings after several pharmaceutical companies have 
explicitly notified the agency about listing these patents, it seems that the 
FDA has acquiesced to this practice.199  
Because medical devices are typically developed (and patented) after 
the drug itself, the younger device patent normally outlives the patent on its 
associated drug. Also, the mechanical drug-delivery devices are generally 
easier to modify and patent than the drugs with which they are used in 
combination.200 Accordingly, where the patents on drugs expire and 
potential modifications are limited, device patents can be extended much 
longer and provide increased patent protection.201 By allowing drug-device 
patents to be listed in the Orange Book, the FDA has permitted 
pharmaceutical companies claiming a delivery device to benefit for an 
additional 4.7 years of patent protection on average.202  
A recent study has found that the practice of obtaining and listing 
patents on the drug delivery device has increased in the past twenty years.203 
In 2000, forty-two drug-device combination products existed on the market 
with twenty-nine associated device patents.204 In 2016, however, 127 drug-
                                                           
Should-Drug-Delivery-Device-Patents-Be-Listed-In-the-Orange-Book/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZS2D-25SP] (citing Section 3038 of the 21st Century Cures Act of 2016). 
197 Kestle et al., supra note 196.  
198 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2019); see also Kestle, Miller & Mroz, supra note 196 (citations 
omitted). 
199 GlaxoSmithKline Request for Advisory Opinion Concerning “Orange Book” Listing of 
Patents, FDA Docket No. 2005A-0015 (Jan. 10, 2005); Ropes & Gray on behalf of 
AstraZeneca, Request for Advisory Opinion Concerning “Orange Book” Listing of Patents, 
FDA Docket No. 2006A-0318 (Aug. 10, 2006); Ropes & Gray on behalf of AstraZeneca, 
Request for an Advisory Opinion—“Orange Book” Listings of Patents, FDA Docket No. 
2007A.026 (June 21, 2007); Finnegan on behalf of Forest Laboratories, Inc., Request for 
Advisory Opinion Regarding Patents Listable in the Orange Book in connection with NDA 
No. 202-450, FDA Docket No. FDA-2011-A-0363 (May 12, 2011); Novo Nordisk Inc., 
Request for Advisory Opinion, FDA Docket No. 2012A-1169 (Nov. 26, 2012). 
200 Beall & Kesselheim, supra note 195.  
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 See id.  
204 Id. at 143.  
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device combination products were on the market, and 478 device patents 
were associated with them.205  
This increase in device patenting can likely be attributed to three main 
causes. First, device patenting is playing a larger role in combination 
products’ patent portfolio.206 This is largely due to the tendency of device 
patenting to extend the life of a product’s patent protection longer than the 
patent for the drug itself.207 In fact, in 2016, thirty-two drug products were 
covered exclusively by tertiary device patents.208 Second, more combination 
products now list a larger number of device patents related to the product.209 
Studies have found that, on average, drug-device products list two patents 
on the drug itself and three patents on the delivery device, while thirteen 
percent listed ten or more patents for the delivery device.210 Third, 
companies accrued device patents more frequently than other patents 
relating to the product.211 Again, this is likely because mechanical 
modifications to the delivery device are more readily updated and patented 
than their pharmaceutical counterparts.  
It has been suggested that drugs with a more niche, specialized market 
typically experience fewer paragraph IV patent challenges than those with 
larger scale consumer bases.212 One likely reason for this could be that the 
smaller market for more niche drugs is not sufficient to make up for the 
expenses incurred by a generic company following patent litigation after the 
paragraph IV challenge. As many drug-device combination products serve 
these types of specialized markets, more of the delivery device patents may 
go unchallenged, thus further delaying generic market entry and 
incentivizing companies to list patents further unrelated to their associated 
medicine.213 
While some have criticized the FDA’s practice of allowing patents on 
associated delivery devices to be listed in the Orange Book, in a draft 
guidance report, the FDA has clarified its position on why it considers 
mechanical aspects of delivery systems as part of the “drug product,” making 
                                                           
205 Id. at 142.  
206 Beall et al., supra note 39, at 2. 
207 Id.  
208 Beall & Kesselheim, supra note 195, at 143. 
209 Id.; see also Beall et al., supra note 39, at 3. 
210 Beall et al., supra note 39, at 3; see also Beall & Kesselheim, supra note 195, at 143. 
211 Beall & Kesselheim, supra note 195, at 143 (stating that in seventy percent of the study’s 
sample size, device patents were the last to expire).  
212 Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity 
Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 491, 491 (2007).  
213 Beall & Kesselheim, supra note 195, at 143. 
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them listable.214 As noted in the report, since the mechanical components of 
the delivery system are thought to work in concert with the drug system, they 
are deemed “integral” to the drug product.215 Because these components are 
designed to dispense extremely accurate amounts of a drug, any changes in 
a component could lead to a change in the dose of the drug administered 
to the patient. Therefore, the FDA seems to believe patents on delivery 
devices are necessary for review and listing in the Orange Book.216  
Yet, recent litigation in the First Circuit suggests otherwise and points 
to the FDA’s statements that “[t]he key factor is whether the patent being 
submitted claims the finished dosage form of the approved drug product.”217 
Thus, the First Circuit concluded that components of the drug device that 
do not claim the drug itself are ineligible for listing in the Orange Book.218 
The First Circuit decision comes at a time where the FDA is “unable to 
reach a decision [on the matter] . . . due to the need to address other Agency 
priorities.”219 It seems likely that in the absence of clear FDA guidance, 
courts will continue to fill in and create their own rules for how delivery 
device Orange Book listings ought to be handled.220 
C. Effects on Population 
Permitting companies to list drug-device patents in the Orange Book, 
thereby impeding generic competition, has several potential effects on 
patients who use them. The epinephrine autoinjector, known as the EpiPen, 
                                                           
214 Terry G. Mahn, Michael A. Siem & Elizabeth M. Flanagan, Orange Book Listing 
Opportunities for Drug-Device Combinations, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 18, 2011), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-life-sciences/orange-book-listing-
opportunities-for-drug-device-combinations [https://perma.cc/8Y9M-G9E7]. 
215 Id. (citing FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: METERED DOSE INHALER (MDI) AND 
DRY POWDER INHALER (DPI) DRUG PRODUCTS 60 (2003)). 
216 Id.  
217 Cesar Castillo, Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC (In re Lantus Direct Purchaser Antitrust 
Litig.), 950 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2020) (citing Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New 
Drug: Patent Submission and Listing Requirements and Application of 30-Month Stays on 
Approval of Abbreviated New Drug Applications Certifying That a Patent Claiming a Drug 
Is Invalid or Will Not Be Infringed 68 Fed. Reg. 36,680 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at 
21 C.F.R. pt. 314)). 
218 Id. at 9. 
219 Id. at 10.  
220 See Sara Koblitz, If FDA Won’t Regulate, Maybe the Courts Will: First Circuit Opines on 
Listing Device Patents in the Orange Book, HYMAN, PHELPS, & MCNAMARA: FDA L. BLOG 
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is used for treating severe allergic reactions.221 Although epinephrine, the 
active ingredient in the EpiPen, was first isolated over 100 years ago, the 
product saw price increases of over 400% from 2016 to 2018.222 The primary 
cause of this price increase was the patents on the drug delivery device.223 In 
2015, an estimated 3.6 million Americans were prescribed an EpiPen.224 
Although Mylan, the drug manufacturer, has now released a cheaper 
generic version, at its peak, the EpiPen cost consumers over $700. With an 
expiration date of only eighteen months from the date of manufacture, 
American consumers were spending an estimated $1.8 billion per year on 
EpiPens.225 After the generic version of the EpiPen was released, the price 
dropped to as low as $150.226 Collectively, this could mean that the device 
patents on the EpiPen costed Americans as much as $1.4 billion more for 
essentially the same products.  
In addition to the EpiPen, another commonly patented drug delivery 
product is the inhaler, used for delivering medication into the body through 
one’s lungs. In 2008, the FDA instituted regulations requiring all inhalers to 
stop using ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbon propellants (CFCs).227 This 
led many companies to develop new inhaler designs that were intended to 
work with new, less environmentally harmful, propellants.228 In turn, many 
of these companies began patenting features of these new inhaler designs. 
This caused many off-patent medications to be newly marketed with on-
patent inhalers at double or triple the price of their earlier CFC inhaler 
counterparts.229 
Permitting companies to extend the patent protection on a drug 
through incremental advances in the delivery system of devices may have 
some potential to increase the medication’s therapeutic value by 
                                                           
221 See Beall & Kesselheim, supra note 195. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Kelly Tunney, How Many People Use EpiPens in America? Mylan’s Price Increase Is 
Taking Advantage of Its Users, BUSTLE (Aug. 26, 2016), 
https://www.bustle.com/articles/180800-how-many-people-use-epipens-in-america-mylans-
price-increase-is-taking-advantage-of-its-users [https://perma.cc/3YAD-X4XV]. 
225 Darrell Hulisz, The Soaring Price of EpiPen, RN.COM, https://www.rn.com/featured-
stories/the-soaring-price-of-epipen/ [https://perma.cc/Y7WB-RP5L] (last visited Mar. 10, 
2020).  
226 EpiPen Costs and Alternatives: What Are Your Best Options?, DRUGS.COM (Aug. 20, 
2018), https://www.drugs.com/article/epipen-cost-alternatives.html [https://perma.cc/7Y7C-
Q5PA]. 
227 See Leslie Hendeles, Gene L. Colice & Robert J. Meyer, Withdrawal of Albuterol Inhalers 
Containing Chlorofluorocarbon Propellants, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1344, 1344 (2007). 
228 Beall et al., supra note 39, at 2. 
229 Id. 
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incentivizing the development of a more effective delivery system.230 
However, this therapeutic value must be evaluated against its other negative 
effects. In addition to raising costs for medications, increased modifications 
to mechanical aspects of the delivery device may also “increase the risk of 
product recalls, manufacturing errors, and device failures,” while requiring 
physicians to continuously retrain on how the modified device works.231 
Although not explicitly linked to patent incentives, several drug delivery 
devices have undergone large-scale recalls in the last three years alone.232 
Continuing to make trivial modifications on these devices may increase the 
likelihood of issues in the device design or manufacturing process.233 Such 
events show the seriousness of the situation and the potentially dangerous 
effects of the abuse of the patent system when it comes to pharmaceuticals.  
D. Proposed Solutions 
Before taking action to prevent drug companies from engaging in this 
tertiary form of evergreening, it is important to properly define what conduct 
actually constitutes evergreening and should be prohibited. A general 
definition of patent evergreening would include any secondary or tertiary 
patent that extends the exclusivity period of the product without providing 
any proportionate benefit.234 Under this definition, many patents covering 
improvements to device-delivery systems could still be patented and used to 
extend the product’s exclusivity period.  
Another possibility could be to define evergreening in a more health-
specific way. Under the health-specific definition, any secondary or tertiary 
patent that extends the product’s exclusivity period without a proportionate 
therapeutic benefit would qualify.235 As an example, the patented inhalers 
developed following the FDA’s prohibition on CFC inhalers did benefit 
society by preventing harmful emission of CFCs even though they did not 
produce any health-related benefits to the users.236 Under the definitions 
above, these types of modifications would fall under the health-specific 
definition but would not be considered evergreening under the general 
definition.   
                                                           
230 Beall & Kesselheim, supra note 195, at 143. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 143–44.  
233 Id.  
234 Beall et al., supra note 39.  
235 Id.  
236 Id. 
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1. The Indian Approach 
In 2005, India adopted this health-specific definition and took a major 
step against all types of secondary and tertiary patent evergreening by 
requiring new patent applicants to show that their inventions result in 
enhanced therapeutic efficacy compared to a known compound.237 To make 
this showing, Indian patent applicants must now demonstrate therapeutic 
improvement by way of sufficient clinical evidence.238 Unfortunately, at least 
one study suggests that actions taken by the Indian government have not 
done much to curb secondary patenting and that seventy-two percent of 
secondary patents on drugs were allegedly incorrectly granted to 
applicants.239 According to this study, conditional exceptions to the anti-
evergreening therapeutic efficacy statute allowed drug companies to 
circumvent its restrictions and obtain patents despite failing to show 
therapeutic improvements.240  
The United States could amend its laws in several ways to combat 
tertiary pharmaceutical patent evergreening. First, one option could be to 
adopt a similar prohibition as India against advances that do not provide 
enhanced therapeutic efficacy. However, should the United States adopt 
similar legislation, lawmakers should look to achievements and 
shortcomings in the Indian anti-evergreening statutes to ensure that U.S. 
laws will serve their intended purpose and be fairly enforced. One option 
for doing so could be to permit generic companies to show that the 
proposed advance does not lead to a significant increase in therapeutic 
efficacy over traditional therapies and allow such evidence to invalidate a 
patent. However, such regulations would likely dramatically increase the 
expense of pharmaceutical patent litigation, as each side would probably 
end up having to fund clinical studies to demonstrate therapeutic efficacy 
and spend additional time and money litigating the merits of each study. 
Because branded companies have much higher profit margins and likely 
greater resources to spend in such a fight against a generic competitor, it is 
                                                           
237 Shrimant Singh, India: India’s Tryst with “Evergreening”—An Ongoing Battle, MONDAQ 
(Nov. 28, 2018), http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/758788/Patent/Indias+tryst+with+
Evergreening+An+ongoing+battle [https://perma.cc/2453-JQAL]. 
238 Id.  
239 FEROZ ALI, SUDARSAN RAJAGOPAL, VENKATA S. RAMAN & ROSHAN JOHN, 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT GRANTS IN INDIA: HOW OUR SAFEGUARDS AGAINST 
EVERGREENING HAVE FAILED, AND WHY THE SYSTEM MUST BE REFORMED 6 (2018), 
https://accessibsa.org/media/2018/04/Pharmaceutical-Patent-Grants-in-India.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K633-XN2V]. 
240 Id. at 24. 
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unlikely that this proposed solution would cause generic companies to fare 
much better than in the Indian system.241 
2. The Skinny Labeling Approach 
 A second solution could be for the FDA to allow generic companies 
to follow a similar methodology as that for skinny labeling discussed in 
Section III.A. In skinny labeling, generics are permitted to list an off-
patented use of the drug on its label, which doctors can then prescribe to 
patients for an on-patent use.242 Likewise, if the FDA permitted generic 
companies to market the drug using an off-patent, previously approved 
version of a delivery device, generic companies could enter the market and 
offer cheaper alternatives. Branded companies would still have the 
opportunity to compete with generics by making patented, beneficial 
developments to the device design; however, consumers would have more 
power to determine whether the improvement is worth paying the higher 
cost of the branded drug.  
Such a solution may require modifications to the Hatch-Waxman Act 
and the Orange Book. In the current state, if a generic drug company 
wanted to market a drug using an off-patent delivery device, it would still 
have to make a paragraph IV certification that they are not infringing the 
newer, on-patent device improvements listed in the Orange Book.243 As 
discussed in Section II.D. and illustrated by the Seldane example, such a 
certification could expose the company to expensive patent litigation and a 
thirty-month stay of FDA approval, even though they are in no way 
infringing the device patent.244  
To prevent this problem, the FDA could introduce a different segment 
in the Orange Book, where certain other broader categories of device 
patents could be listed.245 Additionally, if the Hatch-Waxman Act is revised 
so that generic companies would not have to make a paragraph IV 
certification and be subject to litigation when designing around these 
broader device patents, generic companies may be much more likely to 
                                                           
241 See CURT D. FURBERG, BENGT D. FURBERG & LARRY D. SASICH, KNOWING YOUR 
MEDICATIONS: A GUIDE TO BECOMING AN INFORMED PATIENT 56 (2010), 
https://www.express-scripts.com/art/pdf/kap17Medications.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H39-
8JM8]. 
242 Rai & Rice, supra note 84. 
243 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II) (2018). 
244 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2018). 
245 Beall et al., supra note 39, at 12. 
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enter markets for off-patent drugs that are only currently protected by device 
patents.246  
In this case, if generic companies were infringing the patents for the 
drug-delivery device, the patent holder could certainly still sue them for 
patent infringement, as would be the case in almost any other industry. 
Here, however, the Hatch-Waxman Act would not impose an automatic 
thirty-month stay or otherwise prevent approval of the generic by the FDA. 
Thus, patients in need of the drugs could still have access to these low-cost 
generic alternatives while the branded and generic companies litigate the 
patent infringement suit.  
The Orange Book would still perform its function of informing generic 
companies that wish to enter a particular pharmaceutical market of the 
relevant patents without imposing Hatch-Waxman restrictions that block 
them from entering the market.247 However, under this model, there would 
be a need to decide which patents should be listed in which section of the 
Orange Book, as branded companies would be unlikely to voluntarily list 
their patents in the less enforceable section. If this solution were to be 
adopted, it could be left to manufacturers to comply with the FDA 
guidelines in good faith, or risk facing anti-trust liability, as was expressed by 
the First Circuit.248 Alternatively, it may fall to the FDA—as the regulatory 
agency in charge of the Orange Book—to take a more hands-on approach 
to determine what patents should be listed in which section.249  
Although the FDA has made it clear that the agency does not want to 
be in the business of policing Orange Book listings for fear of directing 
litigation toward itself, it may be time for the FDA to get involved.250 The 
current system shifts the social expenses of Hatch-Waxman gamesmanship 
to the patients paying for and relying on the drugs at issue.251 Though the 
Hatch-Waxman Act is intended to expedite generic market entry, by 
                                                           
246 This is because various provisions within the Hatch-Waxman Act serve to deter generics 
from entering the market. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II) (2018). 
247 Orange Book Preface, supra note 50 (“The Addendum to this publication identifies drugs 
that have qualified under the FD&C Act for periods of exclusivity and provides patent 
information concerning the approved drug products in the Orange Book.”). 
248 Cesar Castillo, Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC (In re Lantus Direct Purchaser Antitrust 
Litig.), 950 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2020) (holding that the absence of good faith adherence by a 
branded manufacturer supports a finding of anti-trust liability).  
249 Id.  
250 See Examining Issues Related to Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: A 
Review of the FTC Report, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 50 
(2002) [hereinafter Examining Issues Related to Competition in the Pharmaceutical 
Marketplace] (noting the problematic lack of remedies for generic companies facing 
improperly listed patents in the Orange Book). 
251 See supra Section IV.C. 
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designing a system where generics have to wait on FDA approval and litigate 
with branded companies every time branded companies abuse the rules, the 
legislation may have the opposite effect.  
The FDA maintains that it does not have the expertise to determine 
whether patents in the Orange Book apply to the product and purports to 
push the question downstream for courts to determine during Hatch-
Waxman litigation.252 However, as Orange Book patents become less and 
less related to their corresponding products, perhaps it is time that the FDA 
develops this expertise. Creating some sort of pre-litigation administrative 
pathway for settling listing disputes between branded companies and the 
FDA could help filter out some of the feared claims.253 Settling these 
disputes before generics attempt to enter the market would likely promote 
faster access to low-cost medication.  
A foreseeable issue with the skinny labeling approach could be that it 
would incentivize branded companies to recreate the model of the rescue 
drug, as described in Section III.A.3. Similar to how branded companies 
created uses for drugs that had not yet been approved for any use, branded 
companies may attempt to patent devices to be used with medications that 
have never previously been approved for use with a device.254 Such a tactic 
could have the effect of unnecessarily increasing the number of devices used 
in combination with pharmaceutical products on the market as branded 
companies would be incentivized to pair devices with drugs not for 
therapeutic improvements but for extending the life of their patent 
protection. If the branded company were to accompany this new device 
pairing with a product hop away from non-device treatment, they may be 
successful in blocking out the generic competition that seeks only to sell the 
pharmaceutical product.255 However, this issue could likely be avoided if the 
FDA also permits generic companies to market the pharmaceutical when 
an off-patent, previously approved version of the drug exists without a 
device.  
3. The All-Up-Front Approach 
Third, in addition to, or in place of, creating an additional segment 
within the Orange Book, the FDA could also mandate that branded 
                                                           
252 Examining Issues Related to Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace, supra note 
250, at 64–65 (indicating that the courts should be assessing the validity of the listed patents 
because the FDA does not have the expertise). 
253 Id. at 64. 
254 See supra Section III.A.3. 
255 This is because there would be no earlier-version off-patent device that could be substituted 
for the new patented device. See supra Section III.B.2. 
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companies list all device-related patents in the Orange Book when the drug 
is first placed on the market.256 This would allow branded companies to 
enjoy the same protections afforded by the Hatch-Waxman Act for a limited 
period and simultaneously prevent them from listing new device-
improvement patents after the cutoff date. Again, doing so would allow 
branded companies to sue generics outside of the Hatch-Waxman 
framework, but there would be less motivation to do so because of the 
unavailability of the thirty-month stay provision.  
However, a foreseeable problem of this proposed solution is that 
generics might be less well informed on existing patents related to the 
device, as branded companies may no longer have to publicly list patents 
obtained after the market date in the Orange Book. This could result in 
generic companies unknowingly infringing on patented products or being 
forced to incur additional costs of conducting extensive freedom-to-operate 
research prior to marketing new products.  
In light of the above discussion, the best solution is likely the second, 
“skinny labeling” option with corresponding amendments to the Hatch-
Waxman Act. This solution seems to best allow branded companies to 
benefit from making genuinely beneficial device improvements to therapies 
while preserving the public’s access to greatly needed pharmaceutical 
products. Moreover, this option does not have the same inherent issues of 
leaving generic companies uninformed about branded patents, as seen in 
option three,257 or having the potential to dramatically increase the costs of 
the pharmaceutical patent system, as seen in option one.258  
V. CONCLUSION 
Due in part to the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
pharmaceutical patent evergreening has become extremely profitable for 
branded drug companies seeking to prevent generic companies from 
entering the market. Although not a new phenomenon, branded companies 
have continued to explore and use new methods to delay or prevent generic 
entry into the market, at which point the price of their drugs may decrease 
as much as ninety percent.259  While courts and lawmakers have been 
successful in preventing some abuse of the system by amending provisions 
of the Hatch-Waxman Act and applying antitrust law, companies have 
recently begun to use patents on medical devices related to the drug product 
to restrict generic competition.  
                                                           
256 Beall & Kesselheim, supra note 195, at 143. 
257 See supra Section IV.D.3. 
258 See supra Section IV.D.1. 
259 See IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, supra note 9. 
33
Stemler: Minor Advances, Major Consequences: Hatch-Waxman Administers Excl
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
688 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:3 
This new method of achieving patent exclusivity may have serious 
consequences for patients using the product, as can be seen in recent price 
increases with the EpiPen and inhaler products. Additionally, increased 
modifications could increase the likelihood of product defects or recalls, 
further injuring patients. To combat abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
through device patenting, lawmakers should consider amending the Orange 
Book regulations and the Hatch-Waxman Act to reflect what has been 
allowed by skinny labeling. In this way, the United States might prevent 
minimal incremental advances in delivery devices from blocking generic 
entry and the public’s access to much needed pharmaceuticals.   
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